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In this paper, I am going to cast doubt on an idea that is shared, explicitly or implicitly, by
most contemporary pragmatic theories: that the inferential interpretation procedure
described by Grice, neo-Griceans, or post-Griceans applies only to the interpretation of
ostensive stimuli. For this special issue, I will concentrate on the relevance theory (RT)
version of this idea. I will proceed by putting forward a dilemma for RT and argue that the
best way out of it is to accept that the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure ap-
plies to certain non-ostensive stimuli, contrary to what is generally claimed within RT. In
particular, I will argue that relevance theorists should accept that (ceteris paribus) non-
ostensive emotional expressions in interactions guarantee a presumption of relevance
such that they are interpreted through the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure.
This leads me to propose what I call 'the expressive principle of relevance'.
© 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction: a dilemma for relevance theory
The propositions (a), (b), and (g) below are inconsistent. At least one of them must be rejected. However, as we will see,
upholders of RT have good reasons to accept each. Therein lies the dilemma for RT.1
(a) If an interpretation procedure possesses the following properties (let us call them P), it is an instance of the relevance-
theoretic comprehension procedure: a stimulus is interpreted by an audience through an inferential process guided by
a presumption of relevance whereby the audience takes the information encoded in the stimulus and, thanks to its
mindreading abilities, enriches and complements this information by following a path of least effort until the resulting
interpretation meets its expectation of relevance.
(b) All and only stimuli perceived as ostensive are interpreted through the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure.2
(g) If stimuli perceived as ostensive are interpreted through a procedure with properties P, then some stimuli perceived as
non-ostensive are also interpreted through it.all (neo-/post-)Gricean theories whose scope is restricted to ostensive stimuli (notably Horn, 1984;
a is the following: (i) If a stimulus is interpreted through a procedure P, then it is an instance of (neo-/
imuli that are perceived as ostensive are interpreted through (neo-/post-)Gricean procedure G. (iii) If
gh procedure P, then some stimuli perceived as non-ostensive also are so interpreted.
n of Relevance (1986), in later works Sperber and Wilson (2002; Wilson and Sperber, 2006) make a
rehension procedure is implemented by a Fodorian-like module which is activated exclusively by
plies rejecting the stronger claim. (b) thus makes the dilemma range broader.
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should be appealing to relevance theorists. Since (a) and (b) are already accepted in RT, making (g) plausible will constitute
the main goal of this paper. In x5, wewill see that, as far as I can see, the best way out of the dilemma for relevance theorists is
to reject (b),3 despite the fact that it has been qualified as a central claim of RT (Sperber andWilson, 1995, p. 50), and accept a
modification instead, one that doesn't exclude non-ostensive emotional expressions from the RTCP. This will lead me to
formulate what I call the ‘expressive principle of relevance’ (x5), a principle that complements the communicative principle of
relevance.
2. The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure
The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure (RTCP for short) can be seen as a solution to the problem of code
indetermination (a version of which is the problem of semantic underdetermination). Codes in this context are pre-
established rules that associate information (in particular, messages) and stimuli (in particular, signals) and that must be
mastered by communicators before the act of communication for it to take place successfully. Here is a very simple, famous
code: light one lantern if the enemy comes by land, light two if it comes by sea. In this code, two pieces of information are
respectively encoded into two types of stimuli. At another extreme of complexity, English grammar is a code that associates
phonemes (stimuli) with semantic representations (information) according to pre-established rules (e.g. syntactic) that
communicators using Englishmust possess to achieve successful communication. Codes can also be non-conventional: vervet
monkeys for instance make use of a genetically established code that pairs three kinds of calls (stimuli) with the presence of
three kinds of predators (information).
The problem of code indetermination is that, in many instances of human communication, the relevant codes are




4 Te Peter: Did John pay back the money he owed you?
e Mary: He forgot to go to the bank.According to the relevant code e English syntax and compositional semantics e what Mary says in response to Peter's
question is that John forgot to go to the bank. But, of course, we readily understand much more from her answer. We un-
derstand that John did not pay back themoney he owedMary, that Mary is not talking about a riverbank, but about a financial
institution, and more. But how do we access these pieces of information since they are not encoded in the words that Mary
uses? RT postulates that it is thanks to the RTCP.
To present the RTCP, let us go back to claim (a) of our dilemma. According to (a), if an interpretation procedure possesses
the following eight properties, it is an instance of the RTCP (Sperber and Wilson, 2002, p. 18; Wilson and Sperber, 2006, p.
615ff):
(a) a stimulus is interpreted by an audience through an inferential process (usually unconscious, implicit, spontaneous,
and fast)
(b) guided by a presumption of relevance whereby
(c) the audience takes the information encoded in the stimulus and
(d) thanks to its mindreading abilities
(e) enriches
(f) and complements this information
(g) by following a path of least effort
(h) until the resulting interpretation meets its expectation of relevance.
Let me make two remarks about these eight properties.4 First, (a)-(h) are not to be conceived as sequential steps. For
instance, to decode the signal (property (c)), we sometimes already needmindreading abilities (property (d)) and enrichment
(property (d)), which shows that the temporal order may not follow the alphabetical order. Instead, the interpretative hy-
potheses may be made in parallel and adjusted to achieve a stable and sound inference in their final stage, perhaps by
following ‘mutual parallel adjustment’ (Carston, 2002, pp. 143e146). Second remark: the claim in which we are interested is
not that all eight properties are necessary for the RTCP. In some cases, some of the steps are not needed. Rather, (a) states that
they are sufficient conditions for something to qualify as the RTCP.
Let us illustrate these eight properties with example (1) (from Wilson and Sperber, 2006, p. 615ff).
(a) The interpretation of Mary's utterance is not solely based on a pre-established code but goes through an inferential
process, a form of abductive reasoning (unconscious, implicit, spontaneous, and fast) based on certain premises and the
construction of (ad hoc) hypotheses.uring the writing of this essay, Stravos Assimakopoulos sent me a draft (Assimakopoulos, 2021) which leads to a very similar conclusion, though it is
bout emotional expressions.
hanks to the anonymous reviewers for remarking on these two points.
14
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(c) We take the encoded (literal, semantic) meaning of her sentence as a cue to guess what she meant. As we saw, this is
not sufficient.
(d) Another source of information is our mindreading capacities, i.e. our ability to ascribe mental states to others. Here, for
instance, we ascribe to Mary the belief that it is common knowledge that banks can be financial institutions where one
withdraws or sends money.
(e) As said above, theword ‘bank’ is ambiguous: it canmean river bank, investment bank, and retail bank. Theword ‘he’ too
is ambiguous as it may refer to any male individual. The process of understanding Mary's utterance goes through the
enrichment of the bare code used byMary in the sense that wemust disambiguate the literal meaning of her sentence.
According to the RTCP, we do so thanks to our mindreading abilities and our expectation that Mary's utterance is
relevant.
(f) Once we understand what Mary literally means (Mary's explicature) notably by having resolved the ambiguities of the
code, we further complement this information bymaking hypotheses as to whyMary would have said that. Becausewe
assume her answer is relevant, we understand that no, John has not given her the money back.
(g) We may continue to extrapolate as to the possible implications of Mary's response, for instance by hypothesizing that
either John does not have a great memory or that he was distracted. We may also infer that John won't repay Mary
before he next goes to a bank. We do so by following a path of least effort in the sense that we test the hypotheses that
appear as true or probably true that first come to ourmind, i.e. in order of accessibility, and either accept or reject them.
(h) We stop inferring further conclusions once we are satisfied with an interpretation that makes Mary's utterance suf-
ficiently relevant to us.
We should now have a clear enough idea of what the RTCP is. We may then ask: what are the reasons for a relevance
theorist to reject (a)? Well, since there are, as far as I know, no definitions of the RTCP that conflict with (a), and since the
conjunction of properties (a)-(h) seem to be sufficiently rich to identify RTCP and isolate it from other phenomena, I don't
think there are any. In fact, even a person who disagrees with RT and believes that the way we interpret ostensive stimuli is
wholly different from the process described by the RTCP has no reason to reject (a), because (a) just spells out a sufficient
condition for a technical notion (namely the RTCP). It would bemore reasonable for this person to accept (a) and further claim
that the phenomenon it identifies does not correspond to the way we usually interpret ostensive stimuli.3. RTCP and ostension
Ostensive stimuli are those stimuli that are produced with an informative and a communicative intention according to the
following definitions:5 To a
sometim
ostensi“Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest to the audience an array of propositions I.
Communicative intention: to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the communicator has this
informative intention.” (Sperber and Wilson, 2015, p. 139).This means that ostensive stimuli must make it mutually perceptible or inferable (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 39) to the
audience and communicator that theywere producedwith an informative intention.Whenwe speak, this is usually obviously
the case (unless we are speaking to ourselves, sleep-talking, rehearsing a discourse, etc.). We may also show our intention to
communicate bymany othermeans: if I gesture peculiarlywhile looking intensely into your eyes, youwill probably guess that
I want to inform you of something with this gesture. I could also draw something to you to make it manifest that I have an
intention to inform you of something, or perform any other such action (on ostensive cues see e.g. Csibra, 2010).
Now, according to RT, there is an intimate link between ostension and RTCP. Here is a quote highlighting not only the
intimateness but the uniqueness of the link between ostension and the inferential process postulated by RT5:“The main thesis of this book is that an act of ostension carries a guarantee of relevance, and that this fact ewhich we
will call the principle of relevance [NB: which is called the Communicative Principle of Relevance in the Postface and later
writings] e makes manifest the intention behind the ostension. We believe that it is this principle of relevance that is
needed to make the inferential model of communication explanatory.” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 50).The last sentence states that the inferential model of communicationewhich, in RT's version, includes the RTCP e cannot
be explanatory without ostension. Why? Because without ostension, there is no presumption of optimal relevance e a claim
that we will question below. A stimulus is optimally relevant if it is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing
effort (the interpretation) and if it is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 270). If a stimulus is ostensive, it carries a presumption of optimal relevance e that is what isnticipate: I don't want to deny the existence of an intimate link between ostension and RTCP, but I am skeptical that this link is as unique as it is
es claimed to be. In particular, I find it plausible that the link between RTCP and emotional expressions is as intimate as that between RTCP and
on (see x5).
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then it is worth being processed through the RTCP. According to this reasoning, all stimuli perceived as ostensive are thus
interpreted through RTCP.
But that is not all: we must infer from the last quote that it is not only sufficient that a stimulus carries a presumption of
optimal relevance for it to be interpreted through RT's inferential process (and so the RTCP), but it is also necessary. Indeed,
this is the only way to understandwhy Sperber andWilson claim that the inferential model cannot be explanatorywithout the
Communicative Principle of Relevance, i.e. without the presumption of relevance which comes with ostension.




true (se“There is thus a substantial difference between the frame of mind in which the individual may approach an ostensive
stimulus directed at him and the frame of mind in which he approaches other phenomena. When attending to other
phenomena, he may have hopes of relevance: if such hopes were totally unwarranted, there would be no point in
attending to them at all. […] Even so, [with a non-ostensive stimulus] there can be no general expectation of a steady and
satisfactory level of relevance. With an ostensive stimulus, however, the addressee can have not only hopes, but also
fairly precise expectations of relevance.” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 156 my emphasis).The main point here is that, for any kinds of stimuli other than ostensive stimuli, we cannot expect a stable guarantee of
sufficient relevance. In light of other writings (especially Sperber and Wilson, 2002; Wilson and Sperber, 2006), this means
that we can rationally expect that ostensive stimuli are relevant enough to be worth the effort necessary to make the RTCP
work, but we shouldn't expect any other kinds of stimuli to possess a level of relevance that is always high enough.6
We now have seen why relevance theorists may want to accept claim (b)7
(b) All and only stimuli perceived as ostensive are interpreted through the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure.
Beforewemove on to the third claim, let me emphasize that, although RT has focused on ostensive stimuli and that (b) is a
widespread assumption, the notion of relevance as it is defined by RT does not apply only to ostensive stimuli. Indeed, RT's
cognitive principle of relevance applies to all cognitive inputs. For this reason, RT can be, and indeed has been, applied to non-
ostensive stimuli (see notably some of the essays in Cave and Wilson, 2018; see also Dezecache et al., 2013). It is in this spirit
that I will argue below that, given some assumptions about emotions, the cognitive principle of relevance allows us to derive
not only the communicative principle of relevance, but another principle that applies to non-ostensive emotional expressions.
4. Non-ostensive stimuli and the RTCP
I want to suggest two ideas in this section. First, that the problem of code indetermination e understood in a broad sense
which includes ‘natural codes’ (Wharton, 2003) e also arises with certain information exchanges through stimuli that are
non-ostensive. Second, I will argue that if one accepts that the RTCP as it was described above is a satisfying solution to the
problem of code indetermination for ostensive stimuli (x2), then one should also accept it as such for at least some non-
ostensive stimuli, namely emotional expressions. We will see that, if that is correct, (g) should be appealing to relevance
theorists.
Let us concentrate on the following example:
(2) Jane really likes Maggie and this is weakly mutually manifest among them (Maggie suspects it, Jane suspects that Maggie suspects it, etc.). Jane and
Maggie independently planned to go to a concert tonight.Maggie says “So, it turns out I have to replace Bob at the restaurant tonight…”. Jane sighs. She
didn't sigh with any informative or communicative intention and her sigh didn't carry any indication that she did (not particularly long or loud, etc.).Let usmake the plausible assumption that, with her sigh, Jane updates her andMaggie's mutual cognitive environment, i.e.
the set of assumptions that are mutually manifest to them, with the following propositions:
- p: Jane is undergoing a negative affect (e.g. sadness or disappointment) about the fact that Maggie isn't coming.
- q: Both of them can now be pretty sure that Jane feels positively toward Maggie (in other words, it is now strongly
mutually manifest to Maggie and Jane that Jane feels positively towards Maggie).
If Jane hadn't sighed, these pieces of informationwouldn't have updated their cognitive environment, theywould not have
been inferable byMaggie and Jane, they would not have becomemutually manifest as they have. How canwe account for this
matter of fact?
First of all, we cannot account for how Maggie and Jane's cognitive environment is updated merely by appealing to what
sighs naturallymean (Grice,1957). Contrary to the relation between the dark rings on a trunk and the age of the tree, or to thats seems to be one of the reasons that led Sperber and Wilson (Carston, 2002, pp. 143e146) to propose that the RTCP is implemented by a Fodorian-
dule that is activated exclusively by ostensive stimuli, a claim which entails (b).
ston (2002, pp. 1e7) gives further support to (b) by arguing that it constitutes an answer to the skepticism of Davidson, Chomsky, and Fodor
ing pragmatics: if (b) is true, then pragmatics is not a ‘theory of everything’. To anticipate, let me remark that this consequence also holds if (b*) is
e x5 below). Thus, this argument does not favor (b) over (b*).
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probabilistic versions of natural meaning (for a review see Stegmanm (2015)) won't help here either since there is not a
positive probabilistic correlation between sighs and p or q. It is not even the case that sighs naturally mean (statistically or
not) that someone is undergoing a negative affect, as example (3) below will illustrate.
A more promising notion is that of signal (Hauser, 1996; Maynard Smith and Harper, 2003; Scott-Phillips, 2008; Skyrms,
2010). Signals e in contrast to non-communicative signs e are stimuli that have been designed by evolution to transmit
information from a sender to a receiver. Wharton (2003, 2009) and Green (2007, 2019) successfully apply the notion of signal
to many cases of emotional expression. Furthermore, as Wharton (2003) and Dezecache et al. (2013) argue, it is plausible that
all emotional expressions are signals. If that is correct, we may explain how information about affective states is transmitted
by appealing to how humans and other species are endowed with ‘natural codes’ for emotional expressions (Wharton, 2003,
2009). Natural codes are codes in the sense defined above e i.e. pairings of certain stimuli with certain information that are
mastered by both the sender and the receiver in an act of communication. What is special is that the mastering of these codes
is explained not by convention but by evolution e natural codes do not require conventionalized pairing between a symbol
and some conceptual content.8 This explains notably how non-human animals and infants can express and understand each
other's emotions. See also Origgi and Sperber's (2000) analysis of bee communication through codes.
In our case however natural codes are not sufficient. This is because, if we look at the pre-established pairings between
sighs and the pieces of information they carrye sighs' codee, these pairings won't be sufficient for Maggie to infer that p and
q. Sighs, just like most e and perhaps all e types of emotional expressions, can express many different mental states. It has
been shown that sighs can signal pain, panic, relaxation, relief, sadness, stress, and the will to give up (Teigen, 2008; Vlemincx
et al., 2009). Furthermore, sighs' code doesn't tell us what the sighs are about. If we just look at what is encoded in the sigh, we
won't find what we are looking for e namely p and q.
















imuExactly as (2) except that Jane doesn't like Maggie at all.In this case, it would be reasonable to consider that Jane updates her andMaggie's mutual cognitive environment with the
following pieces of information:
- r: Jane undergoes a positive affect (e.g. relief) about the fact that Maggie isn't coming.
- s: Both of them can now be pretty sure that Jane feels negatively toward Maggie.
Comparing (2) and (3) makes it obvious that the information encoded into sighs is very ambiguous. What a sigh encodes is
that the person is either relieved, or disappointed, or tired, or stressed, or in another affective state with which sighs are
correlated. In other words, we are once again faced with a problem of code indetermination, just as we were with Mary's
utterance in (1). Both are cases of code indetermination in the sense that the information carried by the stimuli themselves is
too ambiguous to explain what information is in fact transmitted. The information that these stimuli encode (whether it be a
string of words or a sigh) is too vague, too indeterminate to account for what we understand from them, for how they update
our mutual cognitive environments.9
Now, for RT, the big difference between, on the one hand, (2) and (3) and, on the other hand, (1) is that Jane's sighs are not
ostensive stimuli. As the examples specify, the sighs were not produced with a communicative and an informative intention.
Spontaneous emotional expressions may well be used as ostensive stimuli (Wharton, 2003, 2009), but they very often are
not (Dezecache et al., 2013). Examples (2) and (3) belong to the latter case. (2) and (3) can advantageously be conceived as
cases of non-ostensive showing. Despite being non-ostensive, Jane's sighs indeed show her emotions in the sense that they
reveal or display them and, plausibly, have the function to do so (for a detailed discussion of showing in this sense, see Green,
2007, Chapters 1e3). Let me say more about this.
Relevance theorists have insightfully argued that, contrary to what Grice (1957) suggested, there is a continuum of cases
between ostensive showing and meaning non-naturally (meaningNN) without clear boundaries (Sperber and Wilson, 2015;
Wharton, 2003, 2009; Wilson andWharton, 2006). However, if this showing-meaningNN continuum only applies to ostensive
stimuli, then the sighs in (2) and (3) do not belong to it.10 Indeed, because Jane sighs without any communicative and infor-
mative intention, (2) and (3) are to be contrasted with cases where the sender ostensively shows an emotional or physiological
response, such as when a child deliberately and openly shows to her mother how pale she is or when Sam ostensively shows
that he is shivering to communicate that he is freezing (Grice, 1989, p. 218; Sperber and Wilson, 2015; Wharton, 2003, 2009,is of course an empirical question whether all emotional expressions possess a communicative function and so whether we should talk about, for
nce, sighs as signals that possess a natural code or as non-communicative signs that possess a natural statistical meaning. My argument can be made in
r case but, in order to avoid lengthy disjunctive formulations, it will be more convenient to followWharton as well as Dezecache et al. and assume that
are signals. Nevertheless, we can keep in mind that a phrase such as ‘Sighs encode x’ could be rephrased as ‘Sighs naturally mean x (in the statistical
)’ and that the ‘problem of code indetermination’ could be rephrased as ‘the problem of indetermination in what stimuli naturally mean in the
tical sense’.
bserve that this notion of indetermination does not depend on the fact that the communicator had informative or communicative intentions.
T has been applied to non-ostensive emotional stimuli, notably by Dezecache et al. (2013) and Sellevold (2018). However, the latter works are about a
ent problem e that of emotional vigilance. They do not discuss the relation between non-ostensive emotional expressions and the RTCP or if these
li have a presumption of relevance.
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intends to reveal something with one's physiological or emotional reaction, such as the blushing of Lily Bart in EdithWharton's
novel The Art of Mirth (1905). We may hypothesize that Lily, at least sometimes, use her blushing intentionally as a commu-
nicative tool (Sellevold, 2018). (2) and (3) are not to be conceived as such: in these examples, it is clear that Jane sighed non-
ostensively. The sighs are not either non-ostensive modifications of ostensive stimuli (such as non-ostensive prosodic modi-
fications of verbal utterances, seeWilson andWharton (2006)). They are fully non-ostensive stimuli. Furthermore, observe that
we don't need to perceive or conceive of the sighs in (2) and (3) as ostensive stimuli to infer p and q or r and s.
In sum, the problem of code indetermination also arises with certain information exchanges through stimuli that are non-
ostensive and perceived as non-ostensive. This was the first point that I wanted to make in this section.
It is easy to multiply the examples where spontaneous emotional expressions convey more than the information they
encode. Think, for instance, about all the different affective states with which low pitched, soft laughter can be associated e a
review of the empirical literature reveals that such laughter correlates with amusement, contempt, fear, incredulity, joy,
sadness, Schadenfreude, social anxiety, urge to affiliate, urge to aggress, and ticklishness (Bonard, 2021, sec.1.5). Even Ekman's
supposedly universal facial expressions of emotion are interpreted to express different emotions in different contexts (see e.g.
Barrett et al., 2011).
Furthermore, evenwhenwe can infer what kind of emotion a stimulus expresses, what the stimulus itself reveals usually
does not allow us to infer what the emotion is about. Nevertheless, we normally automatically get what emotional states are
expressed and what they are about. More generally, there appear to be no unambiguous emotional expressions, although we
usually understand very precise information from them.11
In all these cases, I surmise, we complete the information encoded in the emotional expression through mindreading,
inferential processes. In fact, I believe that the inferential process used to infer pes is the same as the one used to infer the
meaning of ostensive stimuli. In particular, as far as RT is concerned, I would hold the following, which is the third claim of our
dilemma:
(g) If stimuli perceived as ostensive are interpreted through a procedure with properties P, then some stimuli perceived as
non-ostensive also are so interpreted.
You will remember that the properties P are the ones which were discussed in x2:
(a) the stimulus is interpreted by an audience through an inferential process (usually unconscious, implicit, spontaneous,
and fast)
(b) guided by a presumption of relevance whereby
(c) the audience takes the information encoded in the stimulus and
(d) thanks to its mindreading abilities
(e) enriches
(f) and complements this information
(g) by following a path of least effort
(h) until the resulting interpretation meets its expectation of relevance.
Let me take (2) as an illustration of how the inferential process used to interpret certain non-ostensive stimuli possesses
these eight properties. You will notice that this illustration parallels quite strictly the one given for (1) above (x2).
(a) The interpretation of Jane's sigh is not solely based on a pre-established (natural) code but goes through an inferential
process, a form of abductive reasoning (unconscious, implicit, spontaneous, and fast) based on certain premises and the
construction of (ad hoc) hypotheses.
(b) One of the important premises in this inferential process is that Jane's sigh is relevant to the conversation. First, the sigh
does not come out of the blue but is an affective reaction to Maggie's utterance (this is comparable to the fact that we
take Mary's utterance in (1) to be a response to Peter's question and so as relevant to it, although, importantly, the
ostensive element is absent from Jane's sigh). Second, as we will see below, because it is an affective response, we can
take it to indicate that Maggie's utterance is a highly relevant stimulus for Jane.
(c) We take the encoded meaning of her sigh as another premise to guess what information she is thereby transmitting.
The relevant code tells us that her sigh indicates that she underwent (or realistically faked a spontaneous expression
of12) relief, sadness, relaxation, an urge to abandon, or another affective response to what Maggie said (see above). The11 Observe that what I claim here is compatible with the existence of a ‘core meaning’ for emotional expressions, parallel to lexically encoded meaning, i.e.
some information that is encoded in or naturally meant by all tokens of a given type of emotional expression (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this
remark). The expression ‘the information encoded in emotional expressions’ is meant to refer to this core meaning (see footnote 9).
12 If Jane realistically faked a spontaneous expression her emotion, she had an informative intention, contrary to case (2) and (3). However, if she did not
have a communicative intention because she intended to hide her informative intention. This case is different to an ostensive mimicry (e.g. an ostensively
exaggerated sigh) where one has an communicative intention.
18
C. Bonard Journal of Pragmatics 187 (2022) 13e23fact that she underwent an affective response also carries the encoded information that she cared about Maggie's
utterance (more on this below). This decoding is very ambiguous though e someone who is engaged in the conver-
sation will want to know which affective state Jane undergoes and what it is about.
(d) Another source of information is our mindreading capacities, i.e. our ability to ascribe mental states to others. We
ascribe to Jane a liking for Maggie and, relatedly, suppose that an important goal for her is to spend more time with
Maggie, especially outside work. We also attribute to her the inkling that Maggie knows she likes her.
(e) Because sighs are ambiguous, the process of understanding Jane's sigh goes through the enrichment of the bare code in
the sense that we disambiguate what is encoded in the sigh. Thanks to our expectation that Jane's sigh is a relevant
reaction to Maggie's utterance (as opposed to an unrelated reaction such as a sneeze) and thanks to our mindreading
abilities, we infer that Maggie is probably disappointed and/or saddened.
(f) Once we have disambiguated in what psychological state Jane is, we complement this information by making further
hypotheses, for instance concerning what she is sad or disappointed about. This leads us to infer that both of them can
now be pretty sure that Jane feels positively toward Maggie.
(g) We may continue to extrapolate as to the possible implications of Jane's sigh, for instance by hypothesizing that if
Maggie proposed that they go to another gig next week, she would be very glad. We may also hypothesize that, if she
learns that Maggie does not feel the sameway toward her, Janemay be embarrassed by her sigh (because it showed her
feelings).We evaluate the hypotheses that appear as true or probably true by following a path of least effort in the sense
that we either accept or reject the ones that first come to our mind in order of accessibility (or manifestness).
(h) We stop inferring further conclusions once we are satisfied with an interpretation that makes Jane's sigh sufficiently
relevant to us. If, for instance, Maggie does not care a lot about what Jane thinks, she may not find it worth it to make
the effort to draw further conclusions than p and q. If, on the other hand, she does care about her, she may make many
more hypotheses than the ones discussed, because the cognitive cost of doing this inferential work would be
compensated by what she considers to be highly valuable information.
It seems to me that, for those who find it plausible that we interpret ostensive stimuli as in (1) through an inferential
process with properties (a)e(h), it should be just as plausible that we interpret Jane's sigh through an inferential process with
the same properties, even though Jane's sigh is non-ostensive. This is, in substance, claim (g) of our dilemma. I believe that the
considerations in this section make this claim attractive.5. Facing the dilemma: The expressive principle of relevance
Here is, once again, the dilemma with which, I have argued, relevance theorists are faced:
(a) If an interpretation procedure possesses the properties P (see x2), it is an instance of the relevance-theoretic
comprehension procedure.
(b) All and only stimuli perceived as ostensive are interpreted through the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure.
(g) If stimuli perceived as ostensive are interpreted through a procedure with properties P, then some stimuli perceived as
non-ostensive also are so interpreted.
I would reject (b). Instead, I think it should be replaced with the following:
(b*) All stimuli perceived as ostensive are interpreted by the audience through the relevance-theoretic comprehension
procedure. But other kinds of stimuli are so interpreted as well, for instance, stimuli perceived as non-ostensive
emotional expressions in an interaction.
There are three reasons for this proposal. One is that (b*) is compatiblewith (a) and (g), both of which I findmore plausible
than (b). The second is that the arguments that were presented in x3 for accepting (b) only make the first sentence of (b*)
convincing. The third is that emotional stimuli, just like ostensive stimuli, guarantee a presumption of relevance. Let me say a
few words about the second reason before I turn to the third.
We saw that ostensive stimuli always convey a presumption of optimal relevance and that, consequently, all stimuli
perceived as ostensive carry a presumption that they are worth the audience's effort of processing them with the RTCP. But
this only leads to the claim that it is sufficient that a stimulus is perceived as ostensive for it to be processed by the RTCP, which
is what the first sentence in (b*) states. The reasoning leading to (b), i.e. that ostension is sufficient and necessary for the RTCP,
was that there are no other kinds of stimuli that are stable guarantees of sufficient relevance; only ostensive stimuli always
carry a presumption of being worth the effort of going through the RTCP. However, no positive arguments were given for this
stronger claim. Aren't there other kinds of stimuli that carry such a presumption of relevance? As we will see, emotional
stimuli are a candidate for this status.
Aworry that some readers may have at this point is that (b*) opens the door of pragmatics to any old kind of non-ostensive
stimuli, so that pragmatics would turn into a theory of everything, an objection raised by Davidson, Chomsky, and Fodor
(Carston, 2002, p.1). This worry is notwarranted because there is something special about emotional stimuli that makes them19
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to the communicative principle of relevance:





16 OnAny emotional expression in an interaction carries a presumption of (quasi-)optimal13 relevance, i.e. it is relevant
enough for it to be worth the interactant's effort to process it through pragmatic mechanisms, in particular the effort
necessary for the RTCP.14I will now sketch the rationale for this principle. This can only be a tentative argument and more work would be required
to sustain my claims but a detailed argumentation and an exploration of its consequences would require a paper of its own
(Wharton et al., 2021 give arguments that support some of the following). Nevertheless, I hope that the following will suffice
in indicating how the expressive principle of relevance may be derived fromwhat we know about emotions together with the
cognitive principle of relevance.
It has become a consensus in affective sciences that emotions are reactions to stimuli perceived as highly pertinent15 to the
person undergoing the emotion, in the sense that the stimuli are perceived as obstructive or conducive to important goals or
concerns, so that the stimuli in question demands an emotional response (Lange et al., 2020; Sander, 2013; Scherer and
Moors, 2019). In fear, for instance, the fear-inducing stimulus is perceived (unconsciously) as a threat to one's safety or
wellbeing and so as demanding a reaction such as escape or preventive attack, which itself is prepared by the physiological
modifications accompanying fear (increased blood flow, increased breathing, tensed muscles, etc.).
Because (ceteris paribus16) all emotional episodes are reactions to stimuli appraised as highly pertinent to her
goals, when someone reacts emotionally in an interaction, this indicates that something in the context of the
interaction is perceived as highly pertinent. What is highly pertinent to the person with whom we interact may well be
pertinent to us as well, either because it may directly concern us (e.g. a threat to her may be a threat to us) or because
it will have important consequences on the course of the interaction, notably by strongly modifying what is manifest
to our interactant's mind, since the objects of emotions are (ceteris paribus) highly manifest to the person undergoing
them.
Since, according to the cognitive principle of relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 260), human cognition tends to be
geared towards the maximization of relevance, i.e. to the achievement of as many cognitive effects as possible for as little
processing effort as possible, if one detects in the person with whom one is interacting an emotional reaction, because
emotions are reactions to stimuli appraised as highly pertinent, this should trigger an attempt of the audience to hypothesize
what in the context of the interaction is so highly pertinent to the interactant. Not putting in the effort to interpret what
emotional state is expressed and what in the context of the interaction triggered this emotional state could have important
negative consequences, because the audience may be left unaware of something very important for their interaction and
beyond. For instance, in (2) and (3), if Maggie does not try to figure out what emotional state Jane is in andwhat it is about, she
would miss a precious opportunity to gain some very important information about their present interaction and their per-
sonal relation in general. In virtue of the nature of emotions, the cognitive effects to be gained from the interpretation of the
emotional expression of the person with whom one is interacting prima facie make it worth the effort necessary for the
interpretation.
Now, since all emotional expressions are ambiguous (in the sense that there is no code that pairs them with an
emotional state and what this state is about) and that, for reasons given in x4, the disambiguation of emotional expressions
should be done by an interpretation that possesses the properties (a)-(h), all emotional expressions in interactions are
relevant enough to be worth the effort necessary for the RTCP (I thus deny, as per (b*), that only ostensive stimuli trigger
the RTCP).
Let me now say why I use the expression ‘presumption of (quasi-)optimal relevance’ instead of ‘presumption of optimal
relevance’. The official definition of the latter is the following:
(a) “The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it.
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.”
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 270, p. 270)
I have argued that an emotional expression in an interaction, even when it is not ostensive, is relevant enough for it to be
worth the addressee's effort to process it. I have not however given an argument for the claim that it is the most relevantill indicate below why I use ‘(quasi-)optimal’.
ase other accounts of the inferential interpretations turn out to be correct, the mention to the RTCP here should be replaced by whatever inferential
is supposed to play the role that the RTCP plays within RT today.
mally, the word ‘relevant’ rather than ‘pertinent’ is used in this context. I use ‘pertinent’ to avoid presupposing that it is the same as RT's relevance.
er, see Wharton et al. (2021) for the idea that ‘relevance’ in RT and in affective sciences refer to the same property.
the status of ‘ceteris paribus’, see Fodor (1987, Chapter 1).
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use the expression ‘presumption of (quasi-)optimal relevance’ to qualify the fact that all emotional expressions in interactions
are relevant enough to be worth the effort necessary for the RTCP.
I have explained why, given the nature of emotions and the cognitive principle of relevance, it makes sense to hold the
expressive principle of relevance. The argument is less straightforward than the one leading from the cognitive principle to
the communicative principle of relevance, but it nevertheless appears to be sound.
Besides this theoretical argument, empirical evidence may be found in support of e or against e this principle, since it
leads to testable hypotheses. For instance, it predicts that (ceteris paribus) when two people are engaged in a conversation, if
one of them reacts with a detected non-ostensive emotional expression, the interlocutor will infer from this emotional
expressionmore thanwhat is encoded in it. It further predicts that the interlocutor would do so thanks tomental mechanisms
defining the RTCP.
6. Other ways out of the dilemma?
In the last section, I have proposed my favored solution to the dilemma and argued that the expressive principle of
relevance would explain why we should accept (b*) instead of (b). Before I finish, let me briefly mention other options for
relevance theorists that I find less satisfying and respond to two extra objections.
Onemay reject (a) instead of (b) by arguing that the properties (a)-(h) would not be sufficient to identify the RTCP and that
it would need to be characterized in more detail, notably by referring to explicit and implicit content, intended contextual
assumptions and implications, the Communicative Principle of Relevance, and/or other features (for these notions, see
Sperber andWilson, 1995 Postface; Wilson and Sperber, 2006). Once identified with further properties, the RTCP won't apply
anymore to Jane's sigh. One can thusmaintain (b) and (g) by arguing that, even if the argument in section x4 is correct, theway
we interpret Jane's sigh is not through the RTCP, but merely through a similar inferential process.
The problem with this option is that it postulates two largely redundant mental processes used for interpretation (for a
similar point, see Assimakopoulos, 2021, sec. 3). Indeed, it would mean that two distinct mental processes possess properties
(a)e(h), but that one of theme the “true” RTCPe has further properties. However, it seemsmuchmore plausible that there is
only one kind of inferential process and that, with certain stimuli, specialized mechanisms are activated in addition (e.g.
mechanisms specialized for verbal interpretation). This is especially striking if we accept that the RTCP is implemented by an
innately-determined module (Sperber and Wilson, 2002). Why would evolution, which usually is parsimonious, have
selected two different brain mechanisms to do roughly the same job? In other words, the interpretation process described in
x2 seems to be largely the same as the one described in x4, just as the illustration of points (a)e(h) in the two cases seems to
show. But then, why wouldn't relevance theorists accept (a) and call both of them RTCP?
Another option that I find unsatisfying is to reject (g). A relevance theorist may want to do so by arguing that my de-
scriptions of how properties (a)e(h) apply to the interpretation of Jane's sigh are implausible. However, I don't see why the
application of (a)e(h) to Jane's sigh would be any less plausible than to Mary's utterance in (1). Another way to attack (g)
would be to argue that Jane's sigh is perceived as ostensive. The problemwith this claim is that it is widely agreed, including
by relevance theorists (Dezecache et al., 2013), that spontaneous emotional expressions can be produced without the in-
tentions defining ostensive stimuli.18 Why wouldn't Jane's sigh be perceived as non-ostensive?
In any case, rejecting (g) leads to a problem: if it is not through the RTCP that we interpret non-ostensive stimuli whose
codes underdetermine their meaning, then how do we interpret them? And what is faulty about the argument in x4? These
are, I believe, important challenges for the relevance theorists who wouldn't accept (g). I consider that the burden of the
argument now is on their shoulders.
Before I turn to the conclusion, let me address two objections formulated by anonymous reviewers (for which I thank them
very much). The first one is that, although the RTCP has as its proper domain ostensive behavior, it will inevitably respond to
other types of stimuli that are not its proper domain as if they were because they somehow resemble the latter. We can think
for instance about the thought experiment by Knapp and Michael (1982) where waves and other natural phenomena have
somehow created forms on the beach that look like a poem by Woodsworth: this is not an ostensive stimulus but it will
naturally trigger the RTCP.
Of course, this can sometimes happen but, if I am correct in my prediction that (ceteris paribus) all non-ostensive
spontaneous emotional reactions in an interaction trigger the RTCP, then it is not plausible that they always do so because
of an accidental resemblance with non-ostensive behavior, because non-ostensive emotional reactions can be clearly
different from ostensive stimuli (e.g. blushing). As such, the comparison with Knapp and Michael's poem on the beach does17 Here is a tentative argument for this claim: suppose first that the communicator cannot prevent herself from expressing her emotion, that it is
irrepressible. In this case, the communicator's abilities prevent her from displaying any other stimuli. Suppose, now that the communicator could have
prevented herself from displaying her emotion. If she considered that this stimulus was not the most relevant one compatible with her preferences, (ceteris
paribus) she would have refrained herself from producing it, since she had the ability to do so. In both cases, the stimulus appears to be the most relevant
one given her abilities and/or her preferences. Here is another small argument: some may consider that the RTCP is triggered only by stimuli that carry an
assumption of optimal relevance (this was suggested by the remark of an anonymous reviewer although, to the best of my knowledge, this is not stated
explicitly in the RT literature). If that is correct, if (a) is correct (x2), and if the interpretation of non-ostensive emotional expressions in interaction possess
properties (a)e(h) (x4), then it follows that non-ostensive emotional expressions in interactions carry a presumption of optimal relevance.
18 As discussed above, they sometimes are shown ostensively, but it is not the case with Jane.
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non-ostensive and, I have argued, nevertheless be stable triggers of the RTCP, so that an accidental trigger due to a putative
resemblance to ostensive stimuli seems an unsatisfying explanation of the phenomenon.
The second objection is that, if we were to followmy proposal, wemay run a risk of having to assume a very large number
of ad-hoc principles of relevance for any kind of non-ostensive stimulus that is by default treated as having potentially high
relevance, e.g. principles of relevance applying to bright-colored clothes, that someone comes early for their meeting, that
someone doesn't make eye-contact, etc. For instance, what would prevent us from extending my argument to defend that we
need a principle stating: “Any loud noise in the environment carries a presumption of relevance that is strong enough for the
participants in the conversation to put in the effort necessary for an inferential interpretation.”
I respond to this interesting objection by highlighting that, if we follow my proposal, we do not run the risk of devising a
multitude of ad-hoc principles because emotional expressions, like ostension, have a special relation to relevance and
communication, a relation that, prima facie, is rare and potentially unique to these two types of stimuli. The special relation
that relevance and communication possess with ostension is extensively discussed in RT. The one they have with emotional
expressions was sketched in the last section. To sum this up in a nutshell, emotional expressions carry a stable presumption of
relevance e i.e. we can reliably expect that its positive cognitive effects are worth the processing efforts e in virtue of the fact
that emotions are psychological states that involve an appraisal of the situation as being highly conducive or obstructive to
one's goals, and that, in the context of an interaction with someone displaying an emotion, interpreting what the emotion is
and what it is about is always worth the effort. It is not the case that bright-colored clothes (besides the fact that clothes
arguably are ostensive stimuli), early arrivals to a meeting, or loud noises carry a stable guarantee of relevance. For instance,
there are many contexts where loud noises are not relevant enough for us to spend the effort of trying to interpret them,
because, say, they are frequent and signal something benign in this context (e.g. in factories). Furthermore, contrary to
emotional expressions, such stimuli generally do not require an interpretation process with properties (a)-(h). In sum, stimuli
that are often attention-grabbing need not possess a stable presumption of relevance that is high enough to be worth an
interpretation, not to mention an interpretation through the RTCP. By contrast, I argue that emotional expressions in inter-
action do possess it. As such, they play a role comparable to ostensive stimuli in communication (and they do so not because
they resemble ostensive stimuli, as noted above). Maybe other kinds of stimuli also qualify, but I cannot think of any.
7. Conclusion
Although some of the claims defended here are in contradictionwith tenets of RT, all in all, I take it to be good news for RT
because, if I am correct, it would also mean that it could expand its tools e in particular the RTCP e to further territories: the
interpretation of non-ostensive emotional expressions. This prospect is especially interesting for RT since, to the best of my
knowledge, these territories have for the most part remained unexplored (though see e.g. Dezecache et al., 2013; Sellevold,
2018) and since the affective sciences of the past decades have provided awealth of data and theories waiting to be integrated
to pragmatics.
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